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Abstract. In this paper we construct a chosen-key distinguisher and a
related-key attack on the full 256-bit key AES. We deﬁne a notion of
diﬀerential q-multicollision and show that for AES-256 q-multicollisions
can be constructed in time q · 267 and with negligible memory, while
we prove that the same task for an ideal cipher of the same block size
would require at least O(q · 2 q−1q+1 128) time. Using similar approach and
with the same complexity we can also construct q-pseudo collisions for
AES-256 in Davies-Meyer mode, a scheme which is provably secure in
the ideal-cipher model. We have also computed partial q-multicollisions
in time q · 237 on a PC to verify our results. These results show that
AES-256 can not model an ideal cipher in theoretical constructions. Fi-
nally we extend our results to ﬁnd the ﬁrst publicly known attack on the
full 14-round AES-256: a related-key distinguisher which works for one
out of every 235 keys with 2120 data and time complexity and negligible
memory. This distinguisher is translated into a key-recovery attack with
total complexity of 2131 time and 265 memory.
Keywords: AES, related-key attack, chosen key distinguisher, Davies-
Meyer, ideal cipher.
1 Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher which was chosen
by NIST from a set of 15 candidate designs in a thorough evaluation process
that lasted from September 1997 till October 2000. On November 26, 2001 Rijn-
dael [5], a 128-bit block, 128/192/256-bit key block cipher has become a standard
as U.S. FIPS 197 [12]. In June 2003 the US government has approved the use
of 128, 192, 256 bit key AES for SECRET and 192, 256-bit key AES for TOP
SECRET information [13]. In the last ten years AES has been subject to very
intensive cryptanalytic eﬀort, with best currently known attacks breaking 7, 10,
10 rounds for respective keysizes (128, 192, 256), with very high complexities.
In this paper we show for the ﬁrst time in the open literature distinguishers
and related-key attacks on the full 14-round 256-bit key AES. Research presented
in this paper follows the logic described in Fig. 1. First we identiﬁed slow diﬀusion
and other diﬀerential weaknesses in the key schedule of AES-256 which match
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Fig. 1. Outline of the research presented in this paper
nicely with the diﬀerential properties of the round function. This allows us to
construct local collisions for AES, i.e. two round diﬀerence propagation patterns
which result in low weight diﬀerence in the subkeys and zero diﬀerence in the
128-bit block. We concatenate four such local collisions together and add another
6-round trail on top in order to cover full 14 rounds of AES-256. The trail1 has 41
active S-boxes (36 in the block and 5 in the key schedule), so we apply a special
tool, a triangulation algorithm (designed for the purpose of ﬁnding collisions in
hash functions), in order to ﬁnd keys and plaintexts that conform to the trail.
From this point we go in two directions. First we show that for AES-256 one
can construct a chosen-key distinguisher based on the new notion of a diﬀeren-
tial q-multicollision in time q · 267 and with negligible memory. We prove that
the same task for an ideal cipher of the same block size would require at least
q · 2 q−1q+1 128 time for q ≤ 57 and at least q · 2 q−2q+2 128 for q > 57. I.e. for q > 3
the diﬀerential multicollision for AES-256 can be constructed signiﬁcantly faster
than for an ideal cipher. Previously a known-key distinguisher for seven rounds
of AES with 256 texts was found in [11]. To verify our results we found partial
q-multicolisions in several hours on a PC using the publicly available implemen-
tation of AES-256.
As a direct application of this diﬀerential q-multicollision distinguisher we
show that AES-256 when used in the Davies-Meyer mode allows to construct q
pseudo-collisions with ﬁxed diﬀerences ΔIV , ΔM in the IV and the message with
complexity q · 267. Again, such a result would require at least q · 2 q−2q+2 128 time for
the ideal cipher in the Davies-Meyer mode. Results of this type try to enchance
our deﬁnitions of block cipher security and to ﬁll the gap between theoretical
models like random oracle and ideal cipher and the real world of ciphers which
have ﬁxed description and are eﬃciently computable [2,4]. However a proper
security deﬁnition which would capture the intuition behind chosen/known key
attacks is still an open problem.
1 We use colors in the diagrams of the trails, so please refer also to the tables in the
appendix if you print this paper on a black and white printer.
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Table 1. Best attacks on AES-256
Attack # rounds # keys Data Time Memory Source
Known-key integral 7 1 256 256 256 [11]
Partial sums 9 256 285 2226 232 [6]
Related-key rectangle 10 64 2114 2173 ? [1,10]
q-multicollisions 14 2q 2q q · 267 - Sec. 2
Partial q-multicollisions 14 2q 2q q · 237 - Sec. 2.3
Related-key distinguisher 14 235 2119 ∗ 2119 ∗ - Sec. 4.1
Related-key key recovery 14 235 296 ∗ 296 ∗ 265 Sec. 4.2
∗ — for each key.
The second direction that we studied was application of the trails that we
have found to more standard attacks on a block cipher, for example related-key
attacks. In particular we show that by changing the top two rounds of the trail
that we used previously one obtains a diﬀerential trail with only 24 active S-
boxes (19 in the round function and 5 in the key schedule). From this trail we
can construct a diﬀerential distinguisher for AES-256 which works for one key
out of 235 and has complexity 2120 data and time, and negligible memory. This
distinguisher can be used to mount a key-recovery attack on AES-256 with total
complexity of 235+96 = 2131 time and 265 memory. We summarize our ﬁndings
in Table 1.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we prove a lower bound on
the complexity of ﬁnding diﬀerential q-multicollisions in the case of an ideal
cipher and construct a distinguisher for the full AES-256. In Section 3 we show
an application of these results to ﬁnding pseudo-collisions for the Davies-Meyer
hashing mode instantiated with AES-256. In Section 4 we show a related-key
attack on the full AES-256. In Section 5 we discuss new design criteria for block
cipher key schedule as a consequence of our attack. Section 6 concludes the
paper. In Appendix A we provide technical details about our diﬀerential trails.
Discussion. It is clear that the open key (chosen or known) security model
is new and is still lacking a proper security deﬁnition. However we think that
if one can support an open-key attack with a proof of security against such
attack for the ideal cipher, this gives additional conﬁdence that such property
(in our case “diﬀerential multicollisions”) should not be present in a good cipher.
There are many constructions provably secure [3,7] in the ideal cipher model.
This model assumes that both the key and the plaintext are accessible to the
attacker. If a block cipher (e.g., AES) exhibits a property that should not appear
in the ideal cipher then instantiation of a provably secure construction with this
cipher could undesirably weaken the construction. Our Davies-Meyer example
is exactly to show that a construction provably secure in the ICM can break
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down if instantiated with AES-256 (such a hash function was never proposed for
another reason — 128-bit state is too short for a modern hash). The fact that
this property does not automatically carry on to Davies-Meyer instantiated with
all the other block-ciphers (hopefully), shows a non-trivial weakness of AES-256.
2 Multicollision Distinguisher
In this section we provide a chosen-key distinguisher for AES-256 which has
practical complexity.
Deﬁnition 1. A set of two diﬀerences and q pairs
{ΔK , ΔP ; (P1,K1), (P2,K2), . . . , (Pq ,Kq))}
is called a diﬀerential q-multicollision for a cipher EK(·) if
EK1(P1)⊕ EK1⊕ΔK (P1 ⊕ΔP ) = EK2(P2)⊕ EK2⊕ΔK (P2 ⊕ΔP ) =
= · · · = EKq(Pq)⊕ EKq⊕ΔK (Pq ⊕ΔP ). (1)
A diﬀerential q-multicollision can be also viewed as a set of q right pairs with
respect to the related-key diﬀerential, where the key is not ﬁxed.
We compare the task of constructing a diﬀerential q-multicollision for an ideal
cipher with that for AES-256. This task for an ideal cipher, i.e. a set of 2k
randomly chosen permutations, would require treating it as a black-box and
making only encryption/decryption queries. We expect that for a good cipher
with no (yet discovered) structural ﬂaws, the task of constructing a diﬀerential
q-multicollision would have the same complexity as for an ideal cipher.
Let us compute this complexity measured in the number of queries. Since
the cipher is ideal, an adversary is only given an access to the encryption and
decryption oracles, both having two inputs (a key and a plaintext/ciphertext)
and one output. This is the same model of an adversary as in [2,3, p. 329].
In the beginning no triplet 〈plaintext, key, ciphertext〉 is deﬁned. Then, for
each query of the adversary “EK(P ) = ?” the encryption oracle takes a random
value C from a possible range (where EK(·) is yet undeﬁned) and thus deﬁnes
EK(P ) = C. Also E−1K (C) becomes deﬁned. The same rule holds for a decryption
query.
Lemma 1. To construct a diﬀerential q-multicollision for an ideal cipher with
an n-bit block an adversary needs at least O(q · 2 q−2q+2n) queries on the average.
Proof. See Sec. 2.1.
Remark 1. For small q, when the lower bound does not exceed 2n−1, a better
estimate is obtained (see the proof of the lemma). In our case, for n = 128, an
adversary needs at least q · 2 q−1q+1 128 queries if q ≤ 57.
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Surprisingly, diﬀerential multicollisions for AES-256 can be constructed substan-
tially faster. Furthermore, we can set ΔP = 0 in a multicollision, so a stronger
statement holds.
Theorem 1. A diﬀerential q-multicollision with ΔP = 0 for AES-256 can be
found with time complexity q · 267.
Proof. See Sec. 2.2.
Thus for q > 3 a diﬀerential q-multicollision for AES-256 can be constructed
signiﬁcantly faster than for an ideal cipher.2 Therefore, AES-256 can not model
an ideal cipher.
2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let A be an adversary attacking the cipher, and assume that A asks its
oracles a total of L queries, where L < 2n−1. Assume that a multicollision of the
form (1) is found. Let us compute the probability of this event. First, we rewrite
(1) as U1 = U2 = · · · = Uq. With each term Uj = EKj (Pj)⊕EKj⊕ΔK (Pj ⊕ΔP )
we associate an integer tj such that tj-th oracle query determines the value of
Uj , i.e., computes the last (chronologically) element of the sum. Without loss of
generality, assume that t1 < t2 < · · · < tq. Finally, deﬁne t′1 as the index of the
query that determines the ﬁrst element of the sum U1.
U1
︷ ︸︸ ︷
EK1(P1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
queried at t′1
⊕EK1⊕ΔK (P1 ⊕ΔP )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
queried at t1
=
U2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
EK2(P2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
queried before t2
⊕EK2⊕ΔK (P2 ⊕ΔP )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
queried at t2
=
= · · · =
Uq
︷ ︸︸ ︷
EKq(Pq)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
queried before tq
⊕EKq⊕ΔK (Pq ⊕ΔP )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
queried at tq
. (2)
Now compute for every (t′1, t1, t2, t3, . . . , tq) the probability that this set deﬁnes
a diﬀerential q-multicollision. Before submitting ti-th query, i > 1, the following
equation holds:
U1 = U2 = · · · = Ui−1,
where terms of U1, U2, . . . , Ui−1 are completely determined by a tuple (t′1, t1,
t2, t3, . . ., ti−1). Indeed, from t′1 and t1 we deﬁne K1, ΔK , P1, ΔP ; from tj we
deﬁne Kj and Pj .
Just before the moment ti only one term of Ui is computed — w.l.o.g. let it
be EKi(Pi). Thus the equality Ui−1 = Ui should hold, i.e.
Ui−1 = EKi(Pi)⊕ EKi⊕ΔK (Pi ⊕ΔP )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
queried at ti
2 Moreover, even for q = 3 we are not aware of any algorithm faster than 22n/3.
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By our deﬁnition, ti is the ﬁrst moment when EKi⊕ΔK (Pi ⊕ ΔP ) is queried.
Then either the decryption or the encryption oracle is called. In the ﬁrst case
the decryption oracle is called with a ciphertext C and a key K, which for some
i should be equal to Ki⊕ΔK . By the deﬁnition of ti, the value C is chosen from
the set where EKi⊕ΔK (·) is undeﬁned. To become a part of a multicollision,
there should exist Pi such that C = EKi(Pi) ⊕ Ui−1. On the other hand, after
the decryption oracle is called, the following equation should hold:
E−1Ki⊕ΔK (C) = Pi ⊕ΔP . (3)
Since L < 2n−1, not more than 2n−1 texts were encrypted or decrypted with the
key Ki ⊕ΔK . So the probability that (3) holds does not exceed 1/2n−1.
In the second case, let the encryption oracle be queried with a plaintext P
and a key K, which for some i should be equal to Ki ⊕ΔK . For an answer C, a
similar equation should hold:
C = Ui−1 ⊕ EKi(Pi). (4)
The same probability argument holds for this equation. Therefore, for every
i ≥ 2 we get a multiplier 21−n to the probability that a tuple (t′1, t1, t2, t3, . . . , tq)
deﬁnes a diﬀerential q-multicollision. There are
(
L
q+1
)
such tuples, each deﬁning
a diﬀerential q-multicollision with probability at max 2(q−1)(1−n). We get the
following equation for the number of queries required to get a q-multicollision
with probability 1/2:
(
L
q + 1
)
≥ 2(q−1)(n−1)−1. (5)
Let us simplify the left part:
(
L
q + 1
)
=
L!
(L− q − 1)!(q + 1)! =
L(L− 1) · · · (L− q)
(q + 1)!
≤
≤ L
q+1
(q + 1)!
≤ L
q+1
(q+1)q+1
eq+1
=
(
eL
q + 1
)q+1
. (6)
Substitute the result to (5):
(
eL
q + 1
)q+1
≥ 2(q−1)(n−1)−1 ⇒ L ≥ q + 1
e
2
q−1
q+1 (n−1)−1 = O(q · 2 q−1q+1n). (7)
This is the bound for the number of queries needed to construct a multicollision
with probability 1/2. By Markov’s inequality, the average number of queries
exceeds this bound divided by two, so the right part of (7) is still a correct lower
bound.
Now consider the case when L ≥ 2n−1. Let K be the set of keys such that
there were more than 2n−1 encryption or decryption queries on each of these
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keys. Deﬁne l = |K|. If l > q − 2 then L exceeds q · 2n−2, which implies the
statement of the lemma. If l ≤ q − 2 then there are at least q − l sums Ui in (2)
that do not involve keys from K. So if a q-multicollision has been found, then a
(q− l)-multicollision has too been found such that it does not involve keys from
K. Then all the arguments on the probability of this event can be carried out
from the ﬁrst part of the proof.
Therefore, we gets the following inequality on L:
L ≥ q − l + 1
e
2
q−l−1
q−l+1 (n−1)−1 + l · 2n−1.
For l < q/2 we get the following:
L ≥ q
2e
2
q−2
q+2 (n−1)−1 = O(q · 2 q−2q+2 n). (8)
For l ≥ q/2 we get
L ≥ q · 2n−2 = O(q · 2n). (9)
Equations (7), (8), and (9) complete the proof. unionsq
Remark 2. The function FΔK ,ΔP (K,P ) = EK(P ) ⊕ EK⊕ΔK (P ⊕ΔP ) is a xor
of two permutations. Patarin in [14] has shown that the xor of two random
permutations can not be distinguished from a pseudo-random function with less
than 2n queries. In [15] it was proven that q-multicollision search for a random
function requires at least (q!)
1
q 2
q−1
q n eﬀort. In our case we can not use this result
since it assumes that ΔK and ΔP are ﬁxed in advance while we allow an attacker
to choose them during the attack.
2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Here we construct a diﬀerential q-multicollision (1) with ΔP = 0 in q · 267 time.
This is done in 5 steps:
1. Build a diﬀerential trail, which is eﬃcient for the multicollision search.
2. Derive ΔK from the trail.
3. Choose the active S-boxes, whose inputs will be ﬁxed in the triangulation
algorithm. Denote this set by S.
4. Run the triangulation algorithm and derive a set of free variables.
5. Produce q pairs (P,K) for (1) as follows:
(a) Assign inputs to S-boxes from S with admissible values.
(b) Assign free variables randomly.
(c) Produce (P,K).
(d) Check if (P,K) and (P,K ⊕ΔK) ﬁt (1).
We expect that most of our readers are familiar with the description of AES and
thus point out only main features of AES-256 that are crucial for our proof.
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Diﬀerential Trail
Notations. Diﬀerential trail (also called diﬀerential characteristic) is a sequence
of diﬀerences in all the internal states of the cipher and all the subkeys. If we
distinguish only between zero and non-zero (byte) diﬀerences, we call such a trail
a trail with truncated diﬀerences.
We denote the subkey of round i by Ki, i.e. the ﬁrst (whitening) subkey is
K0, the subkey of round 1 is K1, etc., the last subkey is K14. The diﬀerence in
Ki is denoted by ΔKi. Bytes of a subkey are denoted by K li,j , where i stands
for the row index, and j stands for the column index in the standard matrix
representation of AES. Bytes of the plaintext are denoted by Pi,j , and bytes
of the internal state after the SubBytes transformation in round r are denoted
by Ari,j . Let also B
r
i,j denote a byte in position (i, j) after the r-th application
of MixColumns.
Features of AES-256. AES-256 has 14 rounds and a 256-bit key, which is two
times larger than the internal state. Thus the key schedule consists of only 7
rounds. One key schedule round consists of the following transformations:
Ki,0 ← S(Ki+1,7)⊕Ki,0 ⊕ Cr, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3;
Ki,j ← Ki,j−1 ⊕Ki,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3;
Ki,4 ← S(Ki,3)⊕Ki,4, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3;
Ki,j ← Ki,j−1 ⊕Ki,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, 5 ≤ j ≤ 7,
(10)
where S() stands for S-box, and Cr — for the round-dependant constant.
Therefore, every round has 8 S-boxes.
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
Key schedule round
Key schedule round
Fig. 2. A local collision
Weakness in the key schedule. Two fea-
tures of the key schedule help us to build
a good diﬀerential trail. First, the key
schedule has a slow diﬀusion in backward
direction. It means that a diﬀerence in a
single byte K0,0 will propagate to only
two bytes, K0,0 and K0,1, if we apply
the inversion of the key schedule round.
The next inverted round will aﬀect only
one more byte, etc. Thus we can build a
trail with a low-weight diﬀerence in key
schedule if we start with a low-weight dif-
ference in the last round and then step
backwards.
The second feature is unique to AES-
256 due to its “key size”/“state size” ra-
tio, Nk/Nb = 2. We can inject “good”
values with the ﬁrst part of the key and
then cancel them, after they pass the round, with the second part of the key. We
call this a local collision (Fig. 2).
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Constructing a trail. Step by step, we construct a diﬀerential trail from the last
rounds to the ﬁrst ones. The trail is described in details in Appendix A, both in
a truncated form and with the actual diﬀerences given. The trail has 41 active
S-boxes, and 5 of them are in the key schedule.
Search for a solution. After the trail has been deﬁned, we produce a pair (P,K)
which with pair (P,K + ΔK) ﬁts the trail and thus is a part of a diﬀerential
multicollision (1) since all such pairs have the same diﬀerence in the ciphertext.
Now note that the trail explicitly states all the non-zero input δI and output δO
diﬀerences of the S-boxes. According to the S-box properties, there are at most
4 solutions of the equation S(x⊕ δI) ⊕ S(x) = δO. This set of solutions we call
admissible inputs. Therefore, (P,K) and (P,K + ΔK) ﬁt the trail if and only
if in the execution EK(P ) all active S-boxes get admissible inputs. In the next
paragraphs we explain how to construct such executions eﬃciently.
Triangulation Algorithm
Search for free variables. The triangulation algorithm was proposed in [9] as
a tool for solving systems of non-linear equations, which appear in diﬀerential
attacks. Given the constraints on the internal variables, the algorithm outputs a
special set of variables, called free variables. These free variables can be assigned
randomly; and this assignment together with pre-ﬁxed variables completely and
eﬃciently determines the whole execution. The fewer variables are ﬁxed the
better the algorithm works.
Our goal is to eﬃciently produce the cipher executions in which active S-boxes
get admissible values. However, the algorithm can not process all the active S-
boxes of our trail since they are positioned too far from one another.
We found that we can ﬁx inputs to 30 out of 41 S-boxes: all the active S-
boxes in the internal states of rounds 1–4 and all the 5 active S-boxes in the key
scheduling. The triangulation algorithm outputs 18 free variables, out of these 11
are in the key and provide freedom in the choice of the key for the distinguisher.
These free variables are listed below.
Key Internal state
K12,0, K
1
3,0, K
1
3,1, K
2
0,1, K
3
0,1 A
2
0,1, B
2
1,1, B
2
1,2
K32,0, K
3
3,0, K
3
2,1, K
4
0,1, K
5
0,1, K
5
3,3 B
2
2,3, B
2
3,3, A
3
1,1, A
3
1,2
Constructing a pair. Having assigned 18 free variables randomly and 30 S-box
inputs with an admissible value, we substitute these values to the equations,
which have been ordered by the triangulation algorithm. One by one, all the
variables are determined and thus a pair (P,K) is deﬁned. It ﬁts the trail if and
only if the 11 S-boxes not covered by the triangulation algorithm get admissible
values as inputs. For the S-box in round 6 only 2 values are admissible so the
probability is 2−7 while for the other 10 S-boxes 4 values are admissible. This
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results in the overall probability 2−(7+10·6) = 2−67. Thus out of 267 pairs one ﬁts
the trail on average. We wrote a program and checked that the distribution of
the pairs is random enough so the probability estimates are likely to be correct.
We also checked experimentally that bottom 7 rounds of AES produce expected
diﬀerence after 230 pairs on the average, exactly as predicted by the trail.
The complexity of the attack. Recall the scheme of the attack, which was given in
the beginning of the proof. The ﬁrst four steps are precomputations and actually
have negligible cost. The triangulation algorithm works less than a second. The
last step requires only to substitute the values into the equations one by one,
which is computationally equivalent to a single encryption. Thus to get a right
pair we need about 267 operations each equivalent to one encryption. The attack
needs negligible memory and is fully parallelizable.
2.3 Practical Distinguisher
The deﬁnition of diﬀerential q-multicollision can be further relaxed if we allow
arbitrary diﬀerence at some byte positions of ΔP , ΔK or ΔC . Although an at-
tacker gets more freedom, ﬁnding such a construction for an ideal cipher becomes
easier as well. To get a lower bound, only a slight modiﬁcation of Lemma 1 is
required.
For the 13 rounds of AES-256 the complexity of ﬁnding this type of diﬀeren-
tial 5-multicollision, with ﬁxed diﬀerence in 14 bytes of the plaintext and ﬁxed
ciphertext diﬀerence can be lower bounded by 2
4·112
6 = 274.6 computations. For
the full AES-256 a diﬀerential 10-multicollision with half of the plaintext diﬀer-
ence ﬁxed, and the ﬁxed ciphertext diﬀerence the lower bound is 2
9·64
11 = 252.3
computations. Note that these lower bounds are far from being tight. In practice
we expect an eﬀorts of 2112 and 264 for ﬁnding each extra collision for 13 and 14
rounds of AES-256 respectively, since the diﬀerences are structured and ﬁxed.
At the same time we can do it much faster, in just q · 237 in both cases, which
allowed us to compute these distinguishers in several hours on a PC. The actual
values will be given in the extended version of this paper. The core of a practical
distinguisher is a multicollision trail (Figure 5), where the behavior of S-boxes
in the ﬁrst two rounds is not restricted. Computing from the middle, we get
14 bytes with ﬁxed diﬀerence before the second round, and 8 bytes with ﬁxed
diﬀerence before the ﬁrst round. The triangulation algorithm covers all but six
active S-boxes in rounds 3–14 so that we ﬁnd a (partial) q-multicollision with
complexity q · 237.
3 Pseudo-collisions for AES-Based Hashing
The Davies-Meyer mode of blockcipher-based hashing has been proven collision-
resistant if instantiated by an ideal cipher [3]. In this section we show a similar
proof in the ideal-cipher model for the q pseudo-collision resistance, when dif-
ferences in the IV and the message (ΔI , ΔM ) are ﬁxed. We then show that it
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is relatively easy to ﬁnd q pseudo-collisions for AES-256 in the Davies-Meyer
mode. We also point out that we construct one-block pseudo-collisions and thus
the technique of Joux [8] does not apply here.
Our goal is for ﬁxed diﬀerences ΔI , ΔM to ﬁnd many pseudo-collisions for the
HE(I,M) def= EM (I) ⊕ I which is the Davies-Meyer compression function with
AES-256 as the underlying cipher. Here I is the 128-bit IV, and M is a 256-bit
message block. A pseudo-collision satisﬁes the following equality:
HE(I,M) = HE(I ⊕ΔI ,M ⊕ΔM )
Let us rewrite it:
EM (I)⊕ I = EM⊕ΔM (I ⊕ΔI)⊕ I ⊕ΔI ⇔
⇔ EM (I)⊕ EM⊕ΔM (I ⊕ΔI) = ΔI . (11)
While ﬁnding many pseudo-collisions with diﬀerent ΔI , ΔM can be done using
the birthday paradox, the same task for ﬁxed ΔI , ΔM is hard. This problem can
be expressed as ﬁnding a solution of
EM1(P1)⊕ EM1⊕ΔM (P1 ⊕ΔI) = EM2(P2)⊕ EM2⊕ΔM (P2 ⊕ΔI) = · · · =
= EMq (Pq)⊕ EMq⊕ΔM (Pq ⊕ΔI) = ΔI , (12)
which is harder than ﬁnding a diﬀerential q-multicollision for EK(·), because the
ciphertext diﬀerence is unrestricted in (1). Therefore, Lemma 1 gives us a lower
bound on the complexity of this attack.
Corollary 1. To construct q pseudo-collisions (12) with ﬁxed ΔI , ΔM for an
ideal cipher with an n-bit block an adversary needs at least O(q · 2 q−2q+2n) queries
on average.
Theorem 2. For AES-256 in the Davies-Meyer mode q pseudo-collisions (12)
can be found in time q · 267.
Proof. Pseudo-collision attack on the Davies-Meyer mode requires the diﬀerence
in the plaintext P to be equal to the diﬀerence in the ciphertext C. The Davies-
Meyer feed-forward would then cancel this diﬀerence. Our diﬀerential trail needs
only to be slightly modiﬁed for this purpose. The ﬁrst round of the new trail is
shown in Fig. 3 (the actual values are given in Appendix A); the other rounds
are the same.
The resulting trail has 41 active S-boxes. The triangulation algorithm cov-
ers the same active S-boxes as in the proof of Theorem 1 and outputs 18 free
variables. The complexity is thus the same.
Corollary 2. AES-256 can not be used to instantiate the Davies-Meyer hashing
mode.
We expect that similar results can be shown for the other blockcipher-based
constructions which are provably secure in the ideal-cipher model [3].
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SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
Fig. 3. The ﬁrst round of the diﬀerential trail for the attack on AES-256 in the Davies-
Meyer mode
4 Related-Key Attack on AES-256
In this section we demonstrate two results: a related-key distinguisher and a
key-recovery attack based on this distinguisher for the full AES-256.
4.1 Distinguisher
The ﬁrst two rounds of the multicollision trail can easily be modiﬁed to build
a related-key distinguisher with relatively few active S-boxes — see Appendix
A for the details of the trail. The resulting trail has 19 active S-boxes in the
internal states. The diﬀerence propagates through 14 S-boxes with probability
2−6·14, and through the remaining ﬁve with prob. 2−7·5. Therefore, we get a
distinguisher with probability 2−(14·6+5·7) = 2−119. However, the trail has ﬁve
additional active S-boxes (each with probability 2−7) in the key schedule. As a
result, the distinguisher works for 1 out of 235 related-key pairs on the average.
4.2 Key Recovery
There are several ways how our trail can be used for the full 256-bit key recovery.
Here we present one possibility. Steps of the attack are illustrated in Fig. 4 and
are described below.
First step. We change the trail (see Fig. 4 or Appendix) to get more active
S-boxes in the ﬁrst two rounds which allows us to recover the key bytes at the
entrance to these S-boxes. A new trail has eight active S-boxes in the ﬁrst round
in a “checkerboard pattern” and two in the second round. Our goal is to ﬁnd
ten key bytes K00,0, K
0
0,2, K
0
1,1, K
0
1,3, K
0
2,0, K
0
2,2, K
0
3,1, K
0
3,3, K
1
0,0, K
1
0,2 so we
execute the following procedure for each of the 235 related-key pairs:
1. Repeat 231 times:
(a) Compose two structures of 264 plaintexts as speciﬁed below.
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(b) Encrypt the 1st structure with K and the 2nd with K ⊕ΔK .
(c) Sort the ciphertexts and check for a pair with the diﬀerence ΔC .
(d) Save a good pair if it is found.
2. For each candidate pair derive 216 variants for the ten key bytes (see details
below).
3. Pick the key candidate with the maximal number of votes.
The overall complexity of this procedure is 231+65 = 296 data and time, and 264
memory, and it ﬁnds 80 bits of the key.
Each structure has all the possible values in bytes {Pi,j , (i + j) mod 2 = 0}
(these bytes line up in columns 0 and 2 after the ShiftRows of the 1st round). The
other bytes are random constants with the constraint that the two structures are
related by ΔP as in the distinguisher. For a ﬁxed key, each structure contains
264 pairs with the proper diﬀerences after the S-boxes of the 2nd round (yellow
diﬀerences in two bytes). The remaining active S-boxes in rounds 3–14 require
probability 2−93 for the trail to be fulﬁlled. Each structure produces a right pair
of ciphertexts with probability 264−93 = 2−29. Thus 231 structures produce on
average 4 right pairs and 231+128−128 = 231 wrong pairs.
Due to the uniform diﬀerential properties of AES S-boxes each active S-box for
which we know input and output diﬀerences would suggest to us two candidates
for the key byte of this S-box. For a candidate pair we guess two byte diﬀerences3
at B10,0 and B
1
0,2. We know the diﬀerence in the remaining three bytes of each
column, since they should cancel out with the diﬀerences coming from the key.
Thus we can undo the MixColumns for each column which allows us to know
the output diﬀerences of eight S-boxes of the 1st round. We know the input
diﬀerences for these S-boxes from the plaintext. In addition the two guessed
diﬀerence bytes serve as inputs to the two active S-boxes of the 2nd round.
The output diﬀerences for these S-boxes are known from the trail. Thus we
have 10 S-boxes for which we know input and output diﬀerences which gives us
210 · 8 · 8 = 216 possibilities for 80-bits of the key per candidate pair. The 231
wrong pairs would suggest 216 · 231 = 247 random keys, while the four good ones
would all vote for the correct 80-bit key and some random keys. No wrong key
guesses survive this step and we get 80 key bits as a result.
Second step. We proceed with changing top rounds of the trail to derive other
key bytes. We remove the 2−6 condition on the input to the active S-box (0,0) of
the 3rd round. Then we get ﬁve active S-boxes in the second round and 16 active
S-boxes in the ﬁrst round. We prepare 290 pairs with the ciphertext diﬀerence
as in the trail and decrypt them. We will try to detect pairs (290−87 = 8 on the
average) that pass the conditions in rounds 3–14. We partially encrypt all the
resulting plaintext pairs using the known 80-bits and check whether the columns
ΔB1∗,0 and ΔB
1
∗,2 follow the trail. This is a 48-bit ﬁlter on the pairs and thus
we are left with 242 candidate pairs. Then we guess the diﬀerences in bytes B11,1
and B13,3 (eight possibilities due to impossible input/output constraints in ﬁve
3 For each byte diﬀerence there are only 8 possibilities that would not contradict with
the ﬁve known diﬀerences in the 1st and 2nd rounds.
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2−93
SubBytes
Determine 80 bits
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— fixed variables
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Determine 141 bits
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
2−87
SubBytes
Determine 64 bits
II
A1
B1
A2
B2
Fig. 4. Key recovery steps
corresponding S-boxes of the 1st and 2nd rounds), and undo the MixColumns.4.
As a result, we have 242+6 = 248 key candidates from all pairs counting on a
64+16 = 80 bit key (64 from K0 and 16 from bytes K11,1,K
1
3,3). No wrong key
guesses survive this step. We ﬁnd the remaining 12 bytes of K1 by exhaustive
search in 296 steps. The total complexity of the attack is thus dominated by the
296+35 = 2131 complexity of the ﬁrst step.
Second step with TA. If we want to avoid the chosen-ciphertext framework,
there is a way to combine the knowledge of 80 key bits on top and 35 key bits
in the middle with a bit higher complexity. The problem is that the ﬁxed bits
are positioned far from one another (3 key schedule rounds apart), so it seems
hard to make an eﬃcient exhaustive search on the remaining part of the key.
We solve this problem by running the triangulation algorithm on the key
schedule only, where 15 bytes are marked as ﬁxed. The algorithm outputs 17
bytes in diﬀerent subkeys as free variables. Then we assign these variables ran-
domly, choose admissible values for the remaining ones, and thus deﬁne the key
guess. There are 217·8+5 = 2141 possible assignments, which would determine the
complexity of the key recovery.
5 New Design Criteria for Block Ciphers
Our results imply new design criteria for the key schedules of the block ciphers.
First of all, local collisions should be prevented. Although it is usually easy to
4 We use the knowledge of the key byte K10,0 to ﬁnd the diﬀerences in the green
diagonal at the 2nd round.
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arrange a local collision in one round, there should be no good patterns for several
rounds. A slow diﬀusion in the AES-256 key schedule helped us to concatenate
many local collisions into a diﬀerential trail for the whole cipher. This should
not be possible in a good cipher.
The key schedule should be also desynchronized with respect to the internal
state. The active injection bytes in our AES trails are always located in the ﬁrst
row, which is not rotated. Therefore, the diﬀerences to be cancelled in a local
collision should be located in the same column, or exactly 4 columns to the right
in the subkey. This shift is preserved by the key schedule round, which should
be certainly avoided.
Slow diﬀusion in the key schedule makes it also vulnerable to the triangulation
algorithm or similar tools. Our preliminary analysis shows that the triangulation
algorithm can cover up to two times the number of rounds needed for the full
diﬀusion. If the key schedule in AES was ideal, we would be able to solve systems
of equations on at most three-four rounds, while now we can attack ﬁve.
Finally, if one considers known or chosen key attacks as a threat he needs
to add two extra full diﬀusions on top of the number of rounds secure against
standard statistical attacks.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we show a chosen key distinguisher for the 256-bit key AES with
almost practical complexity of q · 267 queries and negligible memory. It was
veriﬁed by computing partial q multicollisions in time q · 237 which takes several
hours on a PC. We also show the ﬁrst related-key attack on the full AES-256
with 296 data and time complexity and 265 memory which works for 1 out of
every 235 keys on average.
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A Details on Trails
The actual diﬀerences. The actual diﬀerence values should satisfy conditions
imposed by the S-box properties, the presence of MC-columns in the subkeys,
etc. We also require that diﬀerences in rounds 5 and 7–13 propagate through
S-boxes with maximal probability — 2−6. We programmed the search for the
actual values and validated that those conditions do not lead to contradictions.
The search has a negligible cost. We thus have deﬁned the diﬀerences ΔK (de-
termined by subkeys K0 and K1) and ΔC (determined by the subkey K14). In
the following subsections we list the actual diﬀerences in the trails.
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Davies-Meyer trail (the ﬁrst two rounds)
i Plaintext Subkey Ciphertext
0
01 01 01 01
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
0f 0e 0f 0e
07 07 07 07
07 07 07 07
09 09 09 09
01 01 01 01
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
i After SB After MC Subkey i After SB After MC Subkey
1
30 0f 44 b0
7c b5 93 08
78 d6 c2 57
e7 c3 29 03
65 00 2b 00
1f 2c 1f 00
1f 00 e2 00
21 00 21 33
37 00 37 00
1f 00 1f 00
1f 00 1f 00
21 00 21 00
2
1b 00 07 00
00 12 00 00
00 00 1a 00
00 00 00 16
0c 00 0e 00
07 00 07 00
07 00 07 00
09 00 09 00
0f 01 0e 00
07 00 07 00
07 00 07 00
09 00 09 00
Related-key distinguisher (the ﬁrst two rounds)
i Plaintext Subkey Ciphertext
0
0e 0e 0e 0e
07 07 07 07
07 07 07 07
09 09 09 09
0f 0e 0f 0e
07 07 07 07
07 07 07 07
09 09 09 09
01 01 01 01
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
i After SB After MC Subkey i After SB After MC Subkey
1
1f 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
3e 00 3e 00
1f 00 1f 00
1f 00 1f 00
21 00 21 00
37 00 37 00
1f 00 1f 00
1f 00 1f 00
21 00 21 00
2
07 00 07 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
0e 00 0e 00
07 00 07 00
07 00 07 00
09 00 09 00
0f 01 0e 00
07 00 07 00
07 00 07 00
09 00 09 00
Note on the colors. Diﬀerential trails are given in our ﬁgures in a truncated
form, we marked distinct diﬀerence values with diﬀerent colors. The reader does
not need to care about the actual values in order to understand how the trail is
constructed. However all the trail diﬀerences are provided in the tables of this
Appendix.
The white cell stands for zero diﬀerence in a byte, the non-white cells stand
for the non-zero diﬀerences. The same colors mean the same values except for
the green, which denotes arbitrary diﬀerences. The exact relation between the
colors and the values can be derived from the list of the actual diﬀerences. Grey
and blue columns stand for MC-columns. In a spoiled MC-column one byte is
marked with another color.
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Diﬀerential trail for ﬁnding multicollisions:
Table 2. Multicollision trail
i Plaintext Subkey Ciphertext
0
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
0f 0e 0f 0e
07 07 07 07
07 07 07 07
09 09 09 09
01 01 01 01
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
i After SB After MC Subkey i After SB After MC Subkey
1
30 5c e1 b0
7c b5 ed 72
a6 d6 c2 16
82 eb 29 03
65 00 02 00
1f 25 1f 00
1f 00 e2 00
21 00 21 33
37 00 37 00
1f 00 1f 00
1f 00 1f 00
21 00 21 00
2
1b 00 07 00
00 12 00 00
00 00 1a 00
00 00 00 16
0c 00 0e 00
07 00 07 00
07 00 07 00
09 00 09 00
0f 01 0e 00
07 00 07 00
07 00 07 00
09 00 09 00
3
1f 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
3e 3e 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
21 21 00 00
37 37 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
21 21 00 00
4
07 07 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
0e 0e 00 00
07 07 00 00
07 07 00 00
09 09 00 00
0f 0e 00 00
07 07 00 00
07 07 00 00
09 09 00 00
5
1f 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
3e 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
21 00 00 00
37 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
21 00 00 00
6
07 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
0e 00 00 00
07 00 00 00
07 00 00 00
09 00 00 00
0f 01 01 01
07 00 00 00
07 00 00 00
09 00 00 00
7
1f 1f 1f 1f
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
3e 3e 3e 3e
1f 1f 1f 1f
1f 1f 1f 1f
21 21 21 21
3e 3e 3e 3e
1f 1f 1f 1f
1f 1f 1f 1f
21 21 21 21
8
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
01 00 01 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
9
1f 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
3e 00 3e 00
1f 00 1f 00
1f 00 1f 00
21 00 21 00
3e 00 3e 00
1f 00 1f 00
1f 00 1f 00
21 00 21 00
10
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
01 01 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
11
1f 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
3e 3e 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
21 21 00 00
3e 3e 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
1f 1f 00 00
21 21 00 00
12
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
13
1f 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
3e 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
21 00 00 00
3e 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00
21 00 00 00
14
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
01 01 01 01
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
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SubBytes
RCSBAC
ShiftRows
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SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
RCSBAC
ShiftRows
MixColumnsSB
ShiftRows
MixColumns
7
8
9
10
11
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ShiftRows
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RCSBAC
ShiftRows
MixColumns
SB
5
6
4
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
RCSBAC
ShiftRows
MixColumns
SB
3
2
1
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
RCSBAC
ShiftRows
MixColumnsSB
ShiftRows
MixColumns
12
13
SubBytes
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
SubBytes
ShiftRowsRCSBAC
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
14
8
SubBytes
SubBytes
SubBytes
SubBytes
SubBytes
Fig. 5. Multicollision trail. The actual values are given in Table 2.
